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Abstract 
Economics is viewed as a discipline that is mainly concerned with ‘simplistic’ 
theorizing, centered upon constrained optimization. As such, it is ahistorical and 
outcome focused, ie, it does not deal with economic processes. It is argued that all parts 
of the economy are inhabited by complex adaptive systems operating in complicated 
historical contexts and that this should be acknowledged at the core of economic 
analysis. It is explained how economics changes in fundamental ways when such a 
perspective is adopted, even if the presumption that people will try to optimize subject 
to constraints is retained. This is illustrated through discussion of how the production 
function construct has been used to provide an abstract representation of the network 
structures that exist in complex adaptive systems such as firms. It is argued that this has 
led to a serious understatement of the importance of rule systems that govern the 
connections in productive networks. The macroeconomics of John Maynard Keynes is 
then revisited to provide an example of how some economists in earlier times were able 
to provide powerful economic analysis that was based on intuitions that we can now 
classify as belonging to complex systems perspective on the economy.  Throughout the 
paper, the reasons why a complex systems perspective did not develop in the 
mainstream of economics in the 20th Century, despite the massive popularity of an 
economist like Keynes, are discussed and this is returned to in the concluding section 
where the prospect of paradigmatic change occurring in the future is evaluated.     
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, an increasing number of natural scientists have adopted a 
‘complex systems’ approach in analyzing and modeling the behavior of energy using 
systems in the chemical, physical and biological domains. Although it continues to make 
good scientific sense to examine, both analytically and empirically, how the component 
parts of a system behave at the microscopic level, there are key connective properties that 
all systems possess in uncontrolled conditions that cannot be discerned through such 
scientific reduction [Potts [2000]]. Complex system science examines the connective 
properties that exist between the elements of systems to discover forms of order that can 
be represented analytically in terms of, for example, graph theory, network analysis, 
power laws, diffusion models, agent-based simulation and replicator dynamics. 
Depending on the kind of system that we are dealing with, the order we observe can 
range from deterministic chaos through to the purposeful creation and destruction of 
connections in complex adaptive systems. Gradually, an analytical toolkit has been 
developed that can be used in a range of different contexts, both to understand the 
historical dynamics of complex systems and, in some cases, to predict their likely time 
paths.1 
 
                                                 
1 See Holland [1995] and Kauffman [1993] for examples in a biological context. 
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The economic system and its component sub-systems are, undeniably, ‘complex adaptive 
systems’.2 Why does this matter to economists who now have at their disposal a vast 
array of sophisticated analytical tools that can be employed to explain virtually all aspects 
of economic behavior? It is easy to think that the cognitive sophistication [or 
‘rationality’] that we observe in human beings is the overwhelmingly most important 
reason why we observe behavior that we can label as ‘economic’ and, therefore, there is 
little need to follow the lead of some evolutionary biologists3, psychologists 4 and 
management scientists5 who feel that all living systems have to be viewed as complex 
systems before their behavior in the space/time continuum can be understood. Because 
economic behavior is seen as uniquely different, many economists are happy to continue 
to work within the boundaries of modern economic theory, particularly since game theory 
entered the theoretical core of economics, rather than to attempt to rethink what they do 
from a complex systems perspective.  
 
However, the public at large and policymakers seem to be much less enthusiastic about 
modern economics than they were in the days when it was a less sophisticated, i.e., a less 
mathematical, discipline. Some economists will tell you that this is because economics 
has become more about the operation of ‘free markets’ than it was and that this loss of 
                                                 
 
2 See Foster [2005] for definitions of different kinds of complex systems.  
 
3 See Depew and Weber [1995] who argue that natural selection explanations evolution are incomplete 
unless they are set within a complex systems  framework. 
 
4 See Byrne [1998] for discussion of how complex system theory can be applied in the social sciences. 
 
5 See, for example, Axelrod and Cohen [1999], McElroy [2002], McKelvey [1999] and Stacey [1996]. 
 2
popularity is not because of the presence of complicated mathematics but because hard-
nosed neoclassical economic doctrine has never been palatable to those wishing to exploit 
or to ‘free ride’ on others. It is true that, at least since the time of Adam Smith, economic 
doctrine, based on the promotion of self-interest and free markets, has not always been 
popular amongst those enjoying economic rents on the political right or those subject to 
exploitation on the left, irrespective of whether it is represented in words or in equations. 
But such a defense implies that we are dealing, primarily, with an ideology rather than a 
science or, at least, what is a science is being viewed from an ideological perspective by 
some members of the public. As a vehicle for ideology, complicated mathematics has a 
great deal of rhetorical power, appearing to the public as  a product of scientific 
endeavors – in television and film, economists invariably appear in front of a black or 
white board on which are written sets of equations. But, at the same time, the economist 
is usually portrayed in jokes as logical to the point of absurdity. What was a discipline 
borne out of very practical considerations is portrayed by some as unworldly and of little 
use. 
 
Despite popular skepticism concerning the realism of economics and of its scientific 
credentials, it is still widely seen as a very useful and constructive ‘way of thinking’ 
about human behavior. If this is the case then it is valid to think of it, at least in part, as a 
form of ideology, but it is very important ideology because it is often viewed as a body of 
ideas that helps to hold market capitalism together. However, this poses a problem 
because, when a science has to bear ideological burdens, it is likely that scientific 
progress will be held back. Thus, we may not see scientific revolutions of the type 
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identified by Thomas Kuhn very often and, furthermore, the ‘protective belt’ that forms 
around a theoretical core, as discussed by Imre Lakatos, will be very difficult to breach.  
 
It will be argued here that thinking about the economy and its sub-components as 
complex adaptive systems can enable economics to break out of this scientific impasse. 
This has been made possible by the fact that game theory, with its situation specific logic, 
has eliminated most of the simplistic theoretical generalizations that used to be employed 
in neo-liberal economic ideology. Instead, economics now offers a vast game-theoretical 
tool kit that is undeniably ‘scientific’ in content and can address a wide range of observed 
economic interactions. Nowadays, economists are becoming highly specialized scientific 
experts. In the post Cold War era, sweeping generalizations of the ideological kind tend 
to be promulgated by political philosophers. The specialization that has occurred in the 
community of economists has, however, made it difficult to make connections with 
advances in complex systems science lying outside economics, in the natural sciences 
and, to a lesser extent, in parts of the social sciences. Such connections are in evidence in 
heterodox economics6 and there are indications that some game theorists have been 
moving in this direction7.  
 
As we shall see, the slow uptake of the complex systems perspective is not only because 
of increased specialization in economics but also because it constitutes a rather 
                                                 
 
6 See Foley [2003], Rosser [1999] and Velupillai [2000] 
 
7 Sent [2004] points out that some game theorists do now accept that the economic system is complex in the 
Simonian sense and have formally incorporated bounded rationality into their models. This tends to alter 
significantly model predictions in comparison with standard treatments.   
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fundamental departure from the commonly held mental models that economists espouse. 
Mainstream economics relies heavily upon constrained optimization, both in interactive 
and non-interactive settings, as its theoretical foundation. As such, it has produced some 
very useful insights into why certain kinds of economic behavior are observed. Of course, 
there has been an unending stream of criticisms of this kind of economics, at least as far 
back as Veblen [1898], in terms of its capacity to explain and predict economic events 
unfolding in historical time. Even one of the founding fathers of modern neoclassical 
economics, Alfred Marshall, felt that such theory should only be permitted to address 
historical events over short periods, although it was viewed as quite permissible to let a 
theory with good short period credentials unfold into is logical ‘long run’ if it was felt 
that this could provide some insight to those engaged in the formulation of economic 
policy [Foster [1993]]. History deals with complicated interactions over time and, as is 
also the case in the natural sciences, one cannot expect any simple theory, cast in ideal 
conditions, to tell us all that much about these. Theory that is specified outside the 
historical time dimension is doomed to be isolated from the flow of events in history. 
Such theory is logically rich but scientifically poor. 
 
Karl Popper [1944,1945] warned of the great dangers involved in trying to get round this 
problem by adopting ‘historicism’, i.e., trying to predict the course of history through 
unconditional theorizing in contexts that involve open systems and evolutionary change 
and he robustly admonished those, such as Karl Marx, who had converted historical 
trends into deterministic ‘laws of history’. Modern economists have, on the one hand, 
adhered to this Popperian position by insisting that theory and history should be separate 
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domains yet, on the other hand, they have often breached the Popperian maxim by 
arguing that historical trends can be ‘explained’ by theoretical propositions that are not 
combinations of conditional theoretical statements, supported by laboratory 
experimentation in ideal conditions, but theories concerning abstract logical tendencies 
towards never existing ‘long run’ equilibrium states. Thus, ‘real business cycle’ theorists 
have proposed idealized optimal planning models that are subject to exogenous 
technological shocks and asserted that there is evidence in support of such theories in the 
macroeconomic tendencies that we actually observe8. From a Popperian perspective, this 
is seriously bad science that, furthermore, leads to the opposite of Popper’s own view 
that, in the social domain, policy-making should be pragmatic and piecemeal, with new 
policies tested, as and when deemed necessary. 
 
From the Popperian perspective, modern economics confronts a fundamental difficulty – 
it is inadmissible to use formal economic theorizing of the neoclassical type to make 
predictions concerning the future, or even predictions concerning past historical events 
since the choice of [untested] conditional relations is subjective and the result of such 
analytics is not necessarily superior to the informed judgment of a historian employing 
intuition and heuristics. There is nothing new in noting this problem - Friedrich von 
Hayek stated it clearly in the 1950s.9 However, today the landscape is different because 
we now have a body of complex systems science in which it is argued that flows of 
                                                 
 
8 Contrast this with the insightful account of economic growth and development by Freeman and Louça 
[2001] as continual structural change as complex adaptive systems interact. 
 
9 See Hayek [1952] and, more recently, Vanberg [2004].  
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events in history, although they look very complicated and difficult to analyze, can, in 
fact, be due to the operation of quite simple rules. Does this mean that modern economics 
is vindicated in the sense that it is, after all, acceptable to think of simple theoretical 
idealizations as lurking beneath the flow of historical events? Or does it mean that we 
have to think in an entirely new way about theory in the economic domain? 
 
These are very big questions and they cannot be answered in any complete way in an 
article of this length. Instead, only two objectives are pursued here. The first objective is 
to explain why complex adaptive systems theory is fundamentally different to standard 
economic theory that has at its core constrained optimization. The second objective is to 
illustrate why this is important through an examination of the role of the production 
function construct in economics. To emphasize the point that the complex systems 
perspective is not entirely new in economics, John Maynard Keynes’ treatment of 
production and processes in his General Theory is viewed from such a standpoint. 
 
Complex versus Simplistic Perspectives on Economic Systems 
Standard economic theory centers upon constrained optimization in the allocation of 
resources, factors of production and goods/services in the face of scarcity. It is theory that 
deals with outcomes, mainly point equilibria that can be deduced analytically. However, 
in recent times, more sophisticated notions of equilibrium states, namely, equilibrium 
curves, e.g., limit cycles, and equilibrium regions, e.g., chaotic domains with ‘strange 
attractors’, have become more common in so called ‘dynamic’ variants of economic 
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theory. However, expanding the notion of an equilibrium state in this way has not been 
particularly helpful because it has made things much more mathematically complicated, 
reducing the predictive power of economic theory and rendering invalid simple and easy 
to understand explanations of economic phenomena [Weintraub [2002]]. 
Correspondingly, difficulty in obtaining equilibrium solutions in the presence of non-
linearity has led to a shift away from mathematical deduction towards numerical 
methods. Also, because it is difficult to connect such mathematically complicated 
theories with the temporally arranged economic data at our disposal, there has been an 
increased reliance on simulation and calibration over traditional econometric methods.  
 
The problem with theories of outcomes, either in simple linear form or in complicated 
nonlinear form, is that they do not capture the processes that occur in the history of the 
economic system. A theory of outcomes and a history of processes, as reflected in the 
monetary valued historical data at our disposal, can only be connected by ad hoc 
contrivances such as presumed ‘disequilibrium dynamics’. However, such dynamics do 
not and cannot capture economic processes but, rather, they are mathematical 
constructions that are necessary before movements in data series can be connected with 
equilibrium outcome theories. Fundamental questions immediately arise concerning the 
scientific value of such theorizing, both in terms of its explanatory power and predictive 
content. The presence of ad hoc dynamics permits a number of different hypotheses, 
drawn from quite different theoretical models, to find support in the same set of historical 
data. Observational equivalence problems always arise in science when two hypotheses, 
one drawn from theory and another that is ad hoc are tested jointly.  
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In a chemistry experiment this is much less likely to happen because of the intimate and 
direct relationship between the process under examination, the data that is generated and 
the hypothesis being tested. Why is this the case? Because experimental controls are 
applied in order to focus attention on a particular process of interest. These controls are 
not abstract assumptions that relate to a timeless body of theory but, rather, they are real 
forces that exist in the space/time continuum in which processes unfold. To put it another 
way, the [controlled] system within which a process is examined is well understood. The 
problem in economics arises because, when the only available data are time series, the 
process in question cannot be studied through a controlled experiment. The mixture of 
fundamental axioms and qualifying assumptions that is employed instead does not result 
in a close connection between process, data and hypothesis.   
 
The systems that we deal with in the economic domain can range from the individual [a 
psychological system] to the whole economy [a macroeconomic system]. These systems 
are not straightforward to deal with because they are complicated and interconnected with 
other non-economic systems such as social, political, biological and ecological systems. 
In the face of this scientific difficulty, the most popular approach in the modern era has 
been to propose that the economic behavior that we observe in reality can be viewed as 
the solution [static or dynamic] of an optimization problem in the presence of constraints. 
This is made manageable and analytically tractable by using a range of ‘simplifying’ 
assumptions.  
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A frequent assumption is to remove the historical dimension of time. Attempts are made 
to relate the resultant timeless [or reversible time] abstraction to the reality of historical 
time in two main ways. First, it can be pretended that the abstraction represents a 
simplified characterization of an actual system moving through historical time in a series 
of snapshots and that reality can be approached by the successive relaxation of 
assumptions. Second, reality can be viewed a deviation from an idealized abstract state, 
i.e., the real world is characterized by ‘disequilibrium’, ‘inefficiency’, etc [analogous to 
the effect of friction in physics].  In Foster [2005], it is argued that neither of these 
approaches to linking abstract theory with reality are scientifically valid in any general 
sense because, in neither case, are the abstractions used true simplifications of the 
behavior of a system in the historical dimension, as is the case in the chemical experiment 
in the laboratory.  
 
Such abstractions are simplistic in construction and, by definition, ontologically separate 
from the behavior that we observe in history. Because of this, it is inappropriate to 
employ them directly in explaining the actual behavior of systems. However, as Alfred 
Marshall argued, simplistic models can be enlightening in studying, for example, price 
movements in very local space/time contexts. In other words, if the time period is short 
enough, the environment stays still enough to allow something analogous to a controlled 
experiment to occur. Thus, the simplistic assumption of ‘perfect knowledge’ is acceptable 
if the choice set is very narrow and there is considerable familiarity with the local 
environment.  
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Many economists, however, go much further than this and claim that simplistic 
abstractions provide intuitive insights in a much more general sense. It has been argued 
that they can provide insights into how what appear to be impossibly complicated 
historical processes work on the ground that those who do optimize subject to constraints 
are likely to survive better than those who don’t. This is an old idea, dating back to 
Alchian [1950] and Friedman [1953], who both suggested that the operation of selection 
mechanisms could mean that neoclassical economic propositions concerning outcomes, 
based on timeless constrained optimization, should show through in actual economic 
behavior. Despite the fact that it is very easy to refute such suggestions [see Penrose 
[1952]], this notion has lingered on in the minds of many economists to the present day.   
 
Selection mechanisms are, of course, closely associated with the work of evolutionary 
economists but it is made clear in this heterodox tradition that such mechanisms can only 
be meaningful if they are set in an analytical framework that allows novelty and variety to 
exist and structural change to occur in systems that are open, not closed [Metcalfe 
[1998]]. Selection is a process that can only occur in systems that are complex and 
adaptive and the economic system and its component sub-systems are all examples of 
complex adaptive systems [Foster and Metcalfe [2001]]. A firm is an excellent example 
but the standard approaches to dealing with these systems involve simplistic theorizing, 
i.e., their histories are viewed as disequilibrium tendencies towards idealized states or it is 
pretended that an idealized, timeless state is a simple skeletal representation of the system 
at any point in time with ‘history’ being due to the impact of exogenous shocks.  
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At first glance, the notion of a complex adaptive system seems to involve very 
complicated behavior that is difficult to deal with analytically. However, the term 
‘complex’ relates to a state of ‘ordered complicatedness’, ie, we are dealing with a system 
that is a network structure which derives its integrity from a set of rules [see Foster 
[2005]]. Once we actually try to address the question of what kind of system we are 
dealing with, theorizing takes on a new meaning. First of all, we can theorize about the 
kind of connective structure, i.e., rules, we are dealing with and, second, we can theorize 
about the processes that such a system experiences/initiates within the context of such 
rules. Despite the apparent complicatedness of a complex system, the set of rules that it 
adopts and the associated processes can be quite simple to represent analytically.  
 
Importantly, complex adaptive systems are all ‘dissipative structures’, i.e., systems that 
are capable of maintaining themselves and growing through the processing of free 
energy. The principles that govern the behavior of dissipative structures in physio-
chemical and biological setting are becoming well understood and this has been helpful 
in beginning to understand how economic systems behave [Foster [2000a]]. However, in 
the economic domain, these principles operate somewhat differently because of the much 
greater role that knowledge has in releasing and deploying free energy. What is common 
to studies of the behavior of all dissipative structures is the necessity that the principles 
that govern such behavior are set, explicitly, in the historical domain. The paths that are 
followed in time are non-equilibrium, not dis-equilibrium, and predominantly 
endogenous in character as energy, materials and information are drawn in by such 
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systems. Of course, exogenous shocks have to be dealt with but these affect the non-
equilibrium trajectory that a system follows, not an equilibrium outcome ideal state.  
 
Standard economic theory involves the use of an ahistorical body of logical propositions 
to represent tendencies observed in the historical domain. In contrast, complex adaptive 
system theory deals directly with the underlying principles that govern the behavior of 
systems in history. Such theory remains an abstraction, as all theory should be, but one 
concerning the rules that govern the connections between elements in a complex system 
and how these rules change over time. For the purpose of analysis, these rules must be 
represented abstractly but they remain stylized versions of actual rules operating in 
systems over time. Constrained optimization is not abandoned since it figures in the set of 
rules that can be applied in economic settings. For example, most firms these days use 
software that can optimize the inventories they hold in terms of material prices, both spot 
and forward, the cost of capital and anticipated demand within the firm. However, in 
other areas of the firm, problems with respect to joint products and discrete commitments 
over long time horizons preclude the use of conventional constrained optimization 
algorithms and, instead, other kinds of rules are applied.   
 
From this perspective, the mathematical logic applied in constrained optimization is a 
special case in a set of algorithmic representations of the rules that govern agent 
behavior. Genetic algorithms can yield optimal solutions suggested by the mathematics of 
constrained optimization if conditions remain static enough. However, in an evolving 
system, constrained optimization is not a rule that makes sense in most circumstances. As 
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Velapullai [2000] explains, it is a rule that is often non-computable from an algorithmic 
perspective. The various rules that are adopted in productive organizations lead to the 
formation of network structures that have a degree of irreversibility, severely restricting 
the extent to which the logic of optimization can be applied. However, despite this, there 
are a multitude of examples in productive organizations of mathematics being applied in 
order that processes can run more smoothly. The use of mathematics is vital in 
engineering, as it is in cost accounting. Furthermore, many rules can be expressed 
mathematically but this does not automatically mean that it is relevant or useful to 
presume that constrained optimization is the dominant rule. 
 
Mathematics can be used deductively at different levels. Constrained optimization offers 
a solution in terms of the best combination elements to attain a desired goal. However, 
mathematics can also be used in a less exotic ways, for example, to explore the logical 
relationships between variables because of accounting rules or of income/expenditure 
feedbacks. Also, it is often possible to track movements in aggregate growth indicators 
that reflect underlying developmental processes. For example, Foster and Wild [1999] 
show how self-organizational development can be captured by the simple logistic 
equation, augmented by conventional economic propositions, and that this provides an 
understanding of the growth of a system in its environment that is not available at lower 
levels of aggregation. By definition, mathematical expressions are deterministic yet they 
still remain useful in summarizing historical tendencies that may contain non-
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deterministic elements. However, acceptance of this descriptive role of mathematics 
proscribes the extent to which logical exercises in deduction can be conducted.10  
 
Economists, compared with, for example, biologists, have a distinct advantage in tracking 
developmental processes because economic structures and processes have monetary 
valuations and thus, it is possible to use mathematics to track asset valuations and streams 
of aggregated data. However, over the past three decades, many economists have 
demanded that the quantifiable trends observed in economic data should be viewed as the 
outcomes economic behavior at the microeconomic level. To this end, theoretical ‘micro-
foundations’ have been proposed.  What these usually amount to is constrained 
optimization by a ‘representative’ agent. From the perspective of complex systems theory 
and the associated view of systems as network structures, what is being asserted is that 
value emanates from the elements that make up a system, not from the connections 
between them. This is a distinctly odd way of looking at a system because unacceptably 
strong assumptions have to be made about connections and about the homogeneity of 
elements. If everything is connected to everything else [‘perfect knowledge’] then there is 
no real distinction between elements and systems. As Mirowski [1989] perceptively 
observed, this ‘force field’ conception of a system, that originated in physics over a 
century ago, became commonplace in the general equilibrium economics that emerged in 
the course of the 20th Century. 
    
                                                 
 
10 See Foster and Wild [1999] p.754 
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However, this does not mean that individuals do not attempt to engage in constrained 
optimization when they can. Indeed, it is almost tautological that they do. What is crucial 
is the nature of the environment in which optimization takes place and whether this can 
be represented analytically. The simplistic systems that populate economic theory are 
assumed to contain elements that are fully connected and this necessitates a range of 
abstract assumptions.11 Complex systems are never fully connected, they are partially 
connected, have actual and potential connections with other systems, i.e., they are open, 
and they are constantly undergoing structural change as old connections break, new ones 
form and [heterogeneous] elements come and go. There is no doubt that constrained 
optimization occurs in complex systems but the goals of behavior, the processes that are 
enacted and the constraints that are faced all change continually. The more pronounced 
these changes are, the less relevant is formal constrained optimization in understanding 
the economic behavior that we observe over time [Bowles and Gintis [2000]]. However, 
as we have noted, we can find instances when there is enough steadiness in goals, 
processes and constraints to allow constrained optimization to be the dominating rule in 
the face of very sparse elements and appropriate flexibility in certain connections, i.e., 
over very short time periods and limited choice domains. This was how Alfred Marshall 
originally viewed constrained optimization as an analytical tool [Foster [1993]].  
 
Over longer periods, the presence of uncertainty induces a tendency to adopt other rules, 
in the form of habits, routines, conventions and norms, which are just as rational in such 
                                                 
 
11 When full connectivity does not prevail there is deemed to be ‘market failure’ of ‘information 
asymmetry’, etc. which implies, incorrectly, that the fully connected state is attainable. 
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conditions [Bowles and Gintis [2000]]. These can be thought of analytically from a 
transactions cost perspective [Williamson [1985]], but not empirically for the simple 
reason that transactions costs cannot be measured except in very specific instances.12 The 
adoption of simple, non-calculative rules, with their low management costs, has the great 
advantage of freeing up time and other resources for the pursuit of new income streams. 
However, adopted rules of this form gradually lose their relevance as the environment 
changes and they are eventually abandoned, i.e., they are not given up through marginal 
adjustments. Why? Because alternatives cannot always be taken up on the basis of 
marginal calculation, either because choices are discrete and lumpy or because there is 
insufficient information available that is suitable for forming probabilities and associated 
calculations of expected values. Complex worlds are explored in order to make 
discoveries, they rarely contain data upon which optimal solutions can be calculated 
using mathematics. It is for this reason that the adoption of routines and habits can be 
viewed as entirely rational from a complex systems perspective.  
 
The network structures that we find in complex adaptive systems are a product of 
learning and experimentation that forges new connections between elements. Because 
some network structures are fundamental to the emergence of other network structures, 
they become tightly bonded, emphasising reliability, rather than adaptability. Thus, 
growth, measured in terms of input or output flows, is the outcome of a cumulative 
                                                 
 
12 Using game theory, Anderlini and Felli [2001] show that the presence of transactions costs renders the 
Coase Theorem, concerning the emergent of efficient outcomes in negotiation, i.e., in complex settings, 
invalid.  
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process, whereby ordered complexity increases, with tight network structures in the core 
and loose ones on the periphery. Such systems face boundaries on their growth that can 
be internal or external. Internal boundaries relate to inflexibilities and breakdowns that 
arise over time because of network irreversibilities and entropy processes.13 External 
boundaries involve the impact of other systems. The key constraints over longer time 
periods are the boundaries that systems face when they are more developed. These can be 
energetic in character, they can be about knowledge limitations or due to the interactive 
ecology of systems. They all imply that growth cannot go on indefinitely. Human 
creativity is the engine of novelty generation, continually creating opportunities for 
growth but income-expenditure identities imply that there must be displacement and 
replacement in expenditure patterns before ‘developmental’ growth can occur. In other 
words, selection processes must operate. In the literature on evolutionary economics,  
competitive selection is generally viewed as something that is faced by a maturing 
economic organization but, equally, highly useful innovative ideas may lie around for 
decades before they are actually selected at all – income-expenditure boundaries not only 
affect the mature, they also impact upon the emergent. 
 
What breaks higher level income-expenditure limitations on growth is a capacity to 
extract more energy and resources, or more goods and services, from a given amount of 
expenditure on energy, materials and information and to have this rise in productivity 
generate IOUs that are accepted as a means of exchange. Thus, income can rise to allow 
                                                 
 
13 See Brooks and Wiley [1986] for a discussion of how boundaries can be internally generated in the 
context of biological evolution. 
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demand to be made effective for new output. Of course, if worthless IOUs are written and 
circulated we have an inflationary problem. Thus, those who accept new IOUs have to 
make subjective assessments concerning their worth – this is a dimension of knowledge 
and it is strongly linked to the accepted rules that operate in debtor assessment.14  Joseph 
Schumpeter understood this well, emphasizing that innovation and growth have to be 
paralleled by the extension of new credit. So, in complex adaptive systems in which 
heterogeneous products are valued in a common currency unit, it is the flow of funds that 
connect systems and their components, presenting both opportunities and limitations on 
what is possible. Thus, the state of effective demand [flows of funds now] and the 
availability of money to provide the reserve base upon which credit expansion can be 
built [flows of funds in the future] are crucial matters in complex adaptive systems of the 
economic kind. The neoclassical notion, that money is a ‘veil’ that doesn’t matter, is not 
at all credible from this perspective.         
 
If we accept that the economy and its components are complex adaptive systems, then the 
use of simplistic representations of systems reduces the relevance economic theory. This 
is what we have witnessed over the past half century. This has been most marked in 
macroeconomics which has, in the main, relied increasingly upon a general equilibrium 
perspective built upon neoclassical microeconomic theoretical foundations that were, 
paradoxically, rendered obsolete when game theory entered the core of microeconomics 
in the 1980s. However, although game theorists have shown that the operation of 
                                                 
 
14 Foster [2005] refers to this as ‘fourth order’ complex behavior. 
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constrained optimization in interactive settings yields a very complicated economy there 
is little sense of a ‘system’ that has emerged in the very extensive game theory literature. 
It is precisely because of this that game theory has only been used in a very limited way 
in macroeconomics. Dopfer, Foster and Potts [2004] note this difficulty with modern 
economics and argue that it is necessary to develop ‘meso’, rule based, theories that can 
be used to analyse the order that we observe in complex economic systems and to 
generate ‘history-friendly’ hypotheses, both in microeconomics and macroeconomics. To 
bring this point home, we shall now focus on a familiar and fundamental construct in 
economics, namely, the production function and, arguably, the 20th Century’s most 
famous economist, John Maynard Keynes.    
 
The Production Function and John Maynard Keynes 
The production function is a central conceptualization in economics. Despite the fact that 
using any aggregate version of such a function was discredited in the ‘capital theory 
controversy’ of the 1970s, it remains embedded in the core of mainstream economics. In 
Foster [2005] it was argued that it is not a suitable analytical construct to deal with 
production in complex, evolving economic systems. Although it is trivial to associate 
inputs with outputs over any chosen time period, in reality, such relations alter over time. 
This alteration can be large and can occur in both smooth and discontinuous forms. It has 
been argued [see Foster and Wild [1999]] that it is better to focus upon these processes of 
change over time, rather than to think in terms of timeless production function 
representations on the move. However, such a position introduces a range of questions 
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concerning how we might deal analytically with the systemic change that we can observe 
going on complex adaptive systems in historical time.  
 
The Foster and Wild approach was to weld conventional perspectives on economic 
theorizing on to diffusional value trajectories in historical time that should be manifest if 
self-organizational development is occurring. However, we must remember that temporal 
trajectories of data do not actually capture historical processes, only manifestations of 
them. Data are no more than quantitative indications that processes are ongoing in the 
time/space continuum. Such data may be, for example, about the volume and value of 
inputs or outputs. This ‘data’ and the ‘process’ by which inputs are transformed into 
outputs are intimately connected but they remain in the separate domains of the 
quantitative and the qualitative.  It is this separation that delimits the extent to which we 
can provide abstract analysis of the processes that give rise to economic value. We have 
aggregations of value but, seemingly, no way of linking these with the patterns of activity 
that give rise to such value. How to deal with this has been one of the main bones of 
contention between orthodox and heterodox economists for at least a century. The former 
have preferred to keep theorizing about the determination of value largely away from 
historical context while the latter have preferred to eschew timeless theorizing in favour 
of historical investigations of economic processes.  
 
This bifurcation in economics occurred in the late 19th Century when ‘marginalists’ in 
England, France and Austria began to challenge the domination of economic historians, 
with their institutionalist orientation towards political economy. Back then, the German 
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Historical School was the main source of institutional thinking in Europe. In the 20th 
Century, this became a contest, increasingly fought out in the United States, between 
institutionalists and emergent neoclassical economists. The watershed in this struggle was 
the Second World War. Before this, institutionalists tended to dominate in a 
pragmatically inclined United States15. Afterwards, neoclassical economics became 
ascendant16, bolstered by a body of Keynesian macroeconomic thinking that became cast 
in terms of a ‘neoclassical synthesis’.  
 
The absorption of Keynes’s ideas into neoclassical economics was important because it 
meant that institutionalist ideas were no longer necessary to justify significant 
government intervention in mixed economies.17 But, more importantly for economics, 
Keynes’s ‘third way’ emphasis upon the link between aggregative historical data and 
theories concerning the functioning of economic systems, such as the principle of 
effective demand, gradually became ignored.  Keynes’ theory was truly ‘general’ because 
it could encompass the historical experience of systems, as reflected in aggregate data, 
and economic theory that was history friendly. Furthermore, neoclassical economics was 
                                                 
 
15 US institutionalism derived its power from the ascendant ‘pragmatic’ school of thought in American 
philosophy and science promoted by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey at the end of 
the 19th Century.  
 
16 Neoclassical economics had English, French and Austrian origins in post-Enlightenment ‘rationalist’ 
philosophy. 
 
17 John Kenneth Galbraith fought tirelessly in the 1960s in his quest to persuade American policymakers 
that the true roots of Keynesianism were institutionalist but, despite his popularity and high profile, this 
was, in the end, to no avail.  
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not abandoned but, instead, it was incorporated, in the Marshallian manner, in local and 
short period settings.  
 
Keynes dug down below aggregate data in search of those aspects of processes that 
induce macro-instability. In the presence of uncertainty, constrained optimization was 
seen as secondary to behavior driven by emotional considerations [‘animal spirits’].  
Also, in uncertainty, expectations were presumed to be interactive, i.e., opinion was 
deemed to be important and this provided the basis of his theory of liquidity preference, 
as a natural counterpoint to emotionally-driven business investment. None of this makes 
much sense in terms of neoclassical economic principles but is entirely consistent with a 
complex adaptive system perspective. Furthermore, the neoclassical conception of 
equilibrium, which was viewed as having no relevance at all to movements in 
macroeconomic data, was swept away in favor of a flow of funds concept of equilibrium 
that was set in the context of historical income-expenditure data. All this was all very 
novel and revolutionary and, of course, difficult to absorb by his peers. Keynes could not 
offer a coherent analytical treatment of what was a mixture of emotional responses to 
uncertain situations that lay deep in the genetic makeup of human beings and what Foster 
[2005] has termed as ‘fourth order’ complex system behavior. Although the fragmentary 
nature of Keynes’s macroeconomics meant that most economists could find something in 
the General Theory to relate to, it also meant that it was vulnerable to widespread attack, 
not for its policy recommendations for which there was wide consensus immediately after 
WWII, but for its perceived theoretical shortcomings.  
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For, the ascendant institutionalists in the United States in the 1930s, Keynes’ theory was 
viewed as too ‘psychologistic’, made too many concessions to neoclassical thinking [of 
the Marshallian type] and was deemed unnecessary to make the case for fiscally based 
stabilization policy. For neoclassical economists, the demotion of constrained 
optimization over production and utility functions to a supporting role, e.g., in the crucial 
area of business investment behavior, seemed, for many, to place Keynes’ theorizing 
outside the domain of economics. Thus, Paul Samuelson felt he could say that “[I]t is 
remarkable that so active a brain would have failed to make any contribution to economic 
theory…” [quoted in Moggeridge [1976], p.156]. This is an important statement because 
it firmly delineates what was deemed acceptable and unacceptable theory amongst many 
prominent economists. This is underlined by the fact that Paul Samuelson, despite this 
critique of Keynes as a theorist, was a committed Keynesian in the policy arena.   
 
In the decade that followed, Milton Friedman and other Chicago economists would offer 
more strident assertions that Keynes had strayed from the domain of economics in a 
fundamental way. Thus, it was no surprise that what Keynes offered as general became 
seen as specific [e.g., disequilibrium adjustment] and what was specific became seen as 
general [neoclassical equilibrium states]. Apart from straying from the neoclassical 
definition of economic theory, Keynes, quite deliberately, did not use the production 
function as a core analytical device in the General Theory – it only regained core status 
with the advent of the neoclassical synthesis. Famously, Keynes reversed Say’s Law by 
abandoning the aggregate production function because it was regarded as meaningless in 
an economy that we can now label as a complex adaptive system. Monetary flows were 
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seen as much more relevant to an understanding of why capitalist economies are prone to 
recessions and the associated underutilization of labor and capital. As has been pointed 
out, complex, interconnected economic systems, dependent on rules, rely, crucially, on 
the connective role of flows of funds.  
 
From a complex adaptive system perspective, Keynes was correct to adopt this stance in 
dealing with aggregates since there can be no formal connection with diverse and shifting 
microeconomic production functions.18 Furthermore, the ‘aggregated value’ 
representation of the economy that Keynes dealt with is the summation of both spot and 
contractual transaction flows in a complex network structure of elements – the 
dichotomisation of aggregate demand and supply has no meaning in such a context. 
However, Keynes had no ambition to analyse the workings of a complex economic 
system in any detail. His main purpose was to carve up the national accounts in a simple 
way to establish that negative expenditure shocks could be countered by deficit financed 
government expenditure shocks in the opposite direction. Crucially, negative expenditure 
shocks were not viewed as random but, instead, driven by ‘animal spirits’ that involved 
persistent and amplifying shifts in the networks of opinion and belief that exist in states 
of uncertainty [Flieth and Foster [2002]]. It was precisely because of the non-random 
character of shocks that stabilization policy could be justified, a point never understood 
by New Classical economists and long forgotten by their New Keynesian bedfellows.  
                                                 
 
18 The identification of a large residual in growth accounting and the observed instability in econometric 
models of aggregate business investment in the postwar era has provided strong vindication for Keynes’ 
view that production function constructs are of very limited usefulness in macroeconomics. 
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So Keynes had in his mind what we would now think of as a complex adaptive economic 
system. Quite erroneously, macroeconomists using neoclassical economic principles, 
have argued that Keynes offered a ‘demand side’ approach and neglected the ‘supply 
side’. Although this has meaning in the neoclassical synthetic version of the Keynesian 
analytical framework it does not in the case of Keynes’ actual writings – there is no 
supply/demand dichotomy at the aggregate level in the complex economic system that he 
envisaged, only a network of connections through which income and expenditure flow in 
exchange for goods and services. Yes, at any point in time, a production function can be 
specified and it can be used to calculate how many factors of production are employed to 
produce the output that is added to the existing stocks that rise and fall over time due to 
demand fluctuations. But the animal spirits that give rise to productive efforts in the first 
place alter both supply and demand conditions over time as innovations in technology 
and organization occur. Thus, using an aggregate production function really tells us little 
or nothing about growth even though it can help us to track short-term movements of 
employment. For example, a bout of ‘expenditure pessimism’ amongst investors or 
consumers will result in falls in income and rises in stocks of finished products and, 
consequently, cuts in production and employment in line with some contemporaneous 
production function relationship. So the availability of the most recent information on 
production relations can help us to predict what the income and employment effects of a 
negative shock will be in the next time period. For Keynes, this was about capacity 
utilization, not movements along a production frontier. 
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Perhaps the most seriously misunderstood part of The General Theory is the discussion of 
the ‘marginal efficiency of investment’. Neoclassical economists, such as Dale 
Jorgenson,19 viewed it as a misspecification of the neoclassical theory of capital and, 
accordingly, he tried to recast it in such terms. This was far off the mark because Keynes 
had attempted to do something radically different. He did not deny that variations in the 
price of capital goods and the cost of capital could affect the amount that a firm wishes to 
employ, i.e., constrained optimization does exist. Instead, he placed this association in a 
wider process of decision-making where a large part of the capital stock [a complex 
network structure] is irreversibly fixed. Thus, the only part of the capital stock that can be 
affected by the cost of capital is new investment. The real issue here, as Scott [1989] 
stressed, is whether it is gross or net investment that is associated with the cost of capital.  
 
If we regard a firm as not just a complex system but also a dissipative structure then the 
relationship that Keynes proposed is correct – the capital stock that currently exists is not 
‘optimal’, it is inherited from history and it is only new investment that can be subject to 
optimization exercises – ‘bygones are bygones’ as Alfred Marshall was fond of saying. 
But time irreversibility implies that constrained optimization is fraught with difficulty. 
The fact that there are significant sunk costs in the case of investments with long lives 
over periods of uncertainty makes decision-making both dangerous and adventurous. In a 
world of technological change and the rise and fall of products and processes, sensible 
investors certainly do use standard cost of capital calculations to explore different 
                                                 
 
19 See Jorgenson [1963] 
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scenarios and, undoubtedly, this eliminates very foolish decisions. However, the bulk of 
the decision has to be based on animal spirits driven by a combination of optimism 
concerning future returns from investment projects and fear that this will constrain future 
flexibility. Thus, optimization in relation to the cost of capital becomes a secondary 
aspect of investment decision-making.20 
  
When we think of the economy as a complex adaptive system, we can see why Keynes 
was correct to downplay production function analysis and related production theory as 
the way to understand business investment at any level. In a sense, this was the greatest 
theoretical contribution in The General Theory.  Regrettably, in the absence of a formal 
way of representing the main driving force of business investment, thinking in terms of 
production functions, involving the relative returns to labor and capital in the long run of 
a neoclassical optimization exercise, is where well-trained economists, such as Paul 
Samuelson, finished up. Decades would pass before Herbert Simon and Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen began to offer economists conceptualizations of human behavior in 
complex economic systems that could encompass Keynes’ insights and even more time 
would elapse before economists would (will?) become aware of the advances in 
complexity science that had been underway in the post WWII era, marked by Nobel 
Prizes for Ilya Prigogine [Chemistry] and, later on, Murray Gell-Mann [Physics]. 
                                                 
 
20 The econometric evidence supports this contention strongly. Investment is most strongly related to 
historical variables, i.e., combinations of lagged dependant and lagged income variables and only weakly 
related to cost of capital measures. Furthermore, such estimated equations are not found to be stable, i.e., 
they do not have equilibrium features.  
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However, very few economists were equipped to follow this path and those who did were 
quickly classified as ‘heterodox’ economists.  
 
One of the limitations of Keynes’s analysis is that the macroeconomic level of inquiry is 
inappropriate to capture the complexity of processes in an economic system – what we 
observe are the stock and flow of funds consequences of complex interactions. The 
elements and connections that make up the network structure of the economy and how 
this changes are, to a large degree, rendered invisible by aggregations of value flows and 
asset valuations. At the same time, a wholly microeconomic perspective that tries to build 
up from individual elements and connections is not very helpful either because so much 
behavior at that level constitutes component connections between elements embedded in 
higher level network structures. This is why Dopfer, Foster and Potts [2004] argue that 
‘meso-level’ analysis, that identifies the generic rules that govern the behavior of 
complex systems, is most appropriate approach. There are many examples of complex 
network structures in the economy that are governed by generic rules that are meso in 
character. For example, as noted above, firms are increasingly looked on as complex 
adaptive systems in the management literature and many of the ‘routines’, identified by 
Nelson and Winter [1982] as the basis of understanding the behavior of the firm, also 
constitute meso rules.   
  
When we examine a productive system, such as a firm, what we see are network 
structures in which elements are connected by flows that are energetic, material and 
virtual in nature. The movement of physical goods, both in the firm and outside it, can be 
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associated with virtual instruments such as entries in accounts, promises to pay and the 
payment of some medium of exchange. Thus, connective flows that result in both the 
creation and the transfer of elements such as physical goods can have measurable values 
in a virtual dimension, i.e., a data field. Although a firm produces elements of value, in 
the form of goods for sale, this value arises from a complex network of connections, not 
from an aggregation of elements. This is why a production function is such a poor 
representation of the firm’s productive process. As Williamson [1985] points out so 
powerfully, the firm is a governance structure, i.e., a network of connections.21 
 
Traditional theories of value tend to be special cases of a connective theory of value. For 
example, the old labor theory of value is really about the value of the connections that 
workers forge in making products – it is a ‘work’ [or energetic] theory of value. The 
utility theory of value focuses upon the connections that are established between products 
and the preferences we have for them when purchase decisions are made – it is a 
subjective theory of value. Utility does not flow from an element such as a consumer 
durable but from the connections made between the durable and the consumer in use. 
Importantly, and again Oliver Williamson has contributed greatly to this, what is a 
connective network structure at one level can be an element at another – thus, we get a 
connective hierarchy.  
 
                                                 
 
21 See Foster [2000b] for a discussion of the connections between transactions cost economics and complex 
adaptive systems theory. 
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However, economists have not been entirely unaware of the importance of connections – 
what they have tended to do is to make very strong and unrealistic assumptions about 
them, allowing the application of the mathematical tools of field theory. For example, 
‘markets’ offer key connections in the economy and, by positing full information [full 
connectedness] in fully interconnected markets, each with supply and demand curves, a 
general equilibrium representation can be achieved. In the case of the firm, full 
information [full connectedness] allows economists to treat the firm as a single decision-
making entity that can optimize in a way that permits a supply curve to be derived from 
its cost structure. We can think of this kind of economics as about over-connected, 
simplistic systems that, by definition, are not representations of reality. Although such 
system representations can be enlightening in coming to an understanding how prices 
might move in approximately static circumstances, they cannot capture the behavior of 
the economy and its components over time in a satisfactory way.  
 
Economies and their constituent firms are network structures in which connections are 
limited and thus, they are complex systems. Connections that are definably ‘economic’ 
are those that have a monetary value attached, i.e., flows of funds exist. Thus, income and 
expenditure flows are much more important than price variations in the production as 
distribution of goods and services. In firms, the goal is to discover organizational 
connections that deliver value added and, externally, the firm’s marketing person/team 
seeks to discover connections with purchasers that result in flows of revenue. These 
connections generate value evolve over time for different firms [asset value] and different 
products [flow value]. As this evolution proceeds, we tend to observe growth that traces 
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out something like a logistic path as new connections are forged, existing ones become 
more reliable and others fall into disuse. This connective structure constitutes a set of 
rules, some which remain idiosyncratic and some that will become generic, ie, they have 
a meso character.22 
   
In analyzing such processes in terms of network theory, rather than production function 
analysis, a novel product that is introduced outside existing production networks will be 
produced locally and individual producers will tend to form a random network with 
adjacent connections to each other. Typically, these are not competitive connections but, 
rather, cooperative ones, as producers are eager to learn from each other in improving 
both product and production processes. From a straightforward game theoretic 
perspective, the anticipated returns from cooperation exceed those involved in a 
competitive standoff.  Inevitably, this produces a great deal of variety in both products 
and processes and replicator dynamics will operate across this variety, again, not so much 
due to direct competition but because the most attractive products can reach a wider 
market, as producers of less attractive variants are persuaded to become components of 
larger production networks through agency agreements, franchises, etc. Although the 
physical movement of products to customers still has to go through conventional 
distribution channels, it is virtual connections, through the mail system, the telephone 
system, the visits of representatives and, now, the internet that are crucial. Ultimately 
                                                 
 
22 Hayek [1967] viewed the emergence of generic rules as a process of ‘spontaneous order’ and, more 
recently, Foster and Wild [1999] have called this ‘economic self-organization’. 
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such processes are likely to result in the formation of a few hubs in a scale free network 
that has a value distribution that can be represented by a power law.23 
 
It is this kind of complex network characterization of production that provides a meso-
foundational basis for Keynes’s macroeconomics. Undoubtedly, in these networks, we 
can observe many of the strategic interactions that have been analyzed using game theory 
and, in this sense, game theoretic microeconomics is entirely complementary to complex 
adaptive systems theory [Sent [2004]]. However, what is urgently needed is the 
development of  new theories concerning the emergence, maintenance and decline of 
meso rules since it is these that stand between the macro and the micro and provide the 
order and continuity in the economic system that allow us to consider it a ‘system’ rather 
than some kind of statistical ‘random walk’.    
  
Concluding Remarks 
The economy is a complex adaptive system. This was grasped intuitively by, among 
others, Alfred Marshall, John Maynard Keynes and, of course, Joseph Schumpeter. 
However, over the past half century, developments in economics have not been based 
upon these intuitions to any significant extent. Instead, constrained optimization became 
the cornerstone of a ‘modern’ economics in which theories were constructed upon this 
particular kind of behavioral rule. In the Cold War era, significant ideological advantages 
came from the emphasis in neoclassical economics upon individual freedom of choice 
                                                 
23 See Barabasi [2002] for further discussion of these network dynamics. 
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and the presumption that well-functioning markets offered the best means of allocating 
resources. With respect to scientific progress, however, the cost of has been high because 
the range of theoretical models in which it is possible to operationalize such optimization 
is quite restrictive and, in consequence, a range of assumptions have to be made before 
such models can be used deductively. Importantly, historical time is usually removed, 
rendering theories simplistic, i.e., they are out of contact with historical processes. Game 
theory, despite its applicability in many contexts, is also outside historical time because it 
is a situation specific logic that focuses upon outcomes based upon strategic 
considerations, i.e., it cannot offer any general representation of multi-agent processes as 
they unfold in time.  
 
The production function is a central construct in modern economics. It has been argued 
that it is an inadequate construct for the purpose of understanding how economic 
processes operate. To some extent, this has been recognized in endogenous growth theory 
but such theorizing does not go nearly far enough [Metcalfe, Foster and Ramlogan 
[2004]]. Complex adaptive systems have to be understood as network structures and their 
evolution involves change and expansion in such networks. Remarkably, Keynes 
developed an approach to economics that is very sympathetic to the view that the 
economy is a complex adaptive system. The influence of Alfred Marshall was clearly a 
main source of his radical perspective. However, in Keynes’ day, the notion of complex 
systems had hardly begun to develop, even in the natural sciences, so all that he could 
offer was a set of connected intuitions that were so alien that some economists did not 
even recognize them as belonging to economic theory. Even Joseph Schumpeter, who 
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also offered insights that can be seen as residing within a complex systems perspective, 
found it difficult to acknowledge Keynes’s remarkably innovative achievements, 
preferring to heap praise upon Leon Walras, who laid down the analytical foundations 
upon which the premier simplistic approach to economic theory would be constructed in 
the post-Second World War era . 
 
In many ways, to further the complex systems perspective in economics, we have to wind 
the clock back – to Alfred Marshall’s struggle with time, to Keynes’s General Theory 
and to the powerful critique of neoclassical economics launched by Friedrich Von Hayek 
before he left the community of economists in disgust to join the lawyers in Chicago. In 
the 1960s, Nicholas Georgesecu Roegen and Herbert Simon offered compelling research 
agendas for the construction of a replacement for neoclassical economics but these were 
largely ignored or cherry picked to bolster established theories, e.g., the adoption of 
Simon’s rational expectation idea in new classical macroeconomics. However, being 
timeless, neoclassical economics has been difficult to supplant because, unconstrained by 
the evidence of history, it has been an infinitely malleable vehicle for clever ideas, 
especially when economic analysis became much more interactive through the use of 
game theory.  
 
Once upon a time, neoclassical economics was thought to offer a unified analytical 
framework but both the advance of game theoretics and changed ideological priorities, 
since the end of the Cold War, have yielded a very specialized and fragmentary 
economics.  Policymakers who used to be comfortable in the tractable world of simplistic 
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neoclassical economics are now very bemused by the technical sophistication and 
complicatedness of the models that they are expected to employ in policy formulation. 
This is, of course, a prescription for non-intervention but, in a world where government 
intervention remains very significant, it also implies that political priorities are free to 
dominate in formulating government taxation and spending choices. What economic 
progress constitutes is no longer clear because we do not have any clear systemic view of 
how the economy and its components work and change.  
 
Both Alfred Marshall and Maynard Keynes began to think of the economy in complex 
system terms and, in so doing, they produced analytical frameworks that were broadly 
intelligible to a wide audience. The eight editions of the Principles of Economics and the 
one edition of the General Theory were never equaled in the 20th Century in terms of 
their influence upon policymakers and the public at large. Each teased out different 
aspects of the economy as a complex system and provided analytical frameworks that 
could be understood by policymakers. The challenge is, once again, to provide some 
relatively straightforward analytical principles that can shed light upon behavior of the 
complex economic system that we have today. This will not be an easy task because, as 
Maynard Keynes noted, there is never a shortage of cleverness, only wisdom, in the 
community of economists.  
 
Economic wisdom involves a capacity to see which particular aspects of a complex 
system are crucial in any particular epoch and to provide a straightforward analytical 
framework in which they can be handled. This has to be done in a way that is not too 
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general as to become valueless and not so theoretical that it loses connection with 
historical experience. Typically, advances of this type in economics do not occur in a 
vacuum – the General Theory was a child of the Great Depression. This is largely why 
the wisdom of, for example, Herbert Simon and Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen did not 
attract much attention in the 1960s, an era of prosperity and growth in which inflation 
began to be viewed as the main economic problem. The emergence of stagflation led to a 
new analysis of inflation in terms of amplified expectational feedback loops which, 
although ultimately set in within very conventional economic models, echoed the work of 
Herbert Simon and others dealing with the analysis of systemic feedbacks back in the 
1950s. Although not usually thought of in this way, the ‘expectational revolution’ in 
macroeconomics represented an advance towards a complex adaptive system perspective 
on the economy. It remains to be seen what great economic problem will arise next to 
provide a fertile environment for the further advance of complex systems science in 
economics.   
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